Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes

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Landscape and image are inseparable. Without image there is no such thing as landscape, only unmediated environment. This distinction can be traced back to the Old English term *landship*, which at first referred not to land but to a picture of it, as in the later, selectively framed representations of seventeenth-century Dutch *landschap* paintings. Soon after the appearance of this genre of painting, the scenic concept was applied to the land itself in the form of large-scale rural vistas, designed estates, and ornamental garden art. Indeed, the development of landscape architecture as a modern profession derives, in large measure, from an impulse to reshape large areas of land according to *prior* imaging. Not only is a collective recognition of land as landscape made possible through exposure to prior images (a phenomenon central to both spectacle and tourist landscapes) but also the ability to intentionally construe and construct designed landscapes is enabled through various forms and activities of imaging.

Whereas imaging is central to forging landscape, the tendency of many contemporary landscape architects to assume that this prioritizes visual and formal qualities alone significantly limits the full eidetic scope of landscape creativity. I use the term *eidetic* here to refer to a mental conception that may be picturable but may equally be acoustic, tactile, cognitive, or intuitive. Thus, unlike the purely retinal impression of pictures, eidetic images contain a broad range of ideas that lie at the core of human creativity. Consequently, how one “images” the world literally conditions how reality is both conceptualized and shaped. That representation exercises such agency and effect is precisely why images in design cannot properly be considered as mute or neutral depictions of existing and projected conditions of secondary significance to their object; on the contrary, eidetic images are much more active than this, engendering, unfolding, and participating in emergent realities. Far from the assumed inertia of passive and objective representations, the paper surfaces and computer screens of design imaging are highly efficacious operational fields on which the theories and practices of landscape are produced. Any recovery of landscape in

contemporary culture is ultimately dependent on the development of new images and techniques of conceptualization.

However, another side of landscape, while still eidetic, has significantly less to do with pictures, or even with any obvious a priori imaging. Both J.B. Jackson and John Stilgoe have documented the complexity of the term landscape and draw distinctions between art-historical, representational versions and vernacular, geographical definitions. They describe the Old German landschaft as actually preceding landskip and as referring not to scenery but to the environment of a working community, a setting comprising dwellings, pastures, meadows, and fields, and surrounded by unimproved forest or meadow. Moreover, as Stilgoe writes, “Like the Anglo-Saxon tithe and the Old French vill, the word meant more than an organization of space; it connote too the inhabitants of the place and their obligations to one another and to the land.”

In other words, the meaning of landschaft comprises a deep and intimate mode of relationship not only among buildings and fields but also among patterns of occupation, activity, and space, each often bound into calendrical time (Fig. 2). In this sense, landschaft is related to the German gemeinschaft, which refers to those forms and ideas that structure society in general. Whereas the scenery of landschaft may be picturesque (that is, to the degree that scenery is a valid or knowable concept in the deeply habituated landschaft), its deeper, existential aspects circle more socially cognitive, eidetic processes. Spatial, material, and ambient characteristics are still here, but their essence is not necessarily that of Cartesian objecthood; they are present in sometimes foggy and multiplicitous ways, structured but not immediately visible—structured, in fact, more through use and habit in time than through any prior schematization.

Distinctions between the designed landscape and the more evolved, working landschaft are further elaborated in cultural geography. As Raymond Williams remarks, “A working country is hardly ever a landscape.” Here, Williams invokes the necessary detachment, contrivance, and focused attention necessary for the formation of landscape. Similarly, in distinguishing between “outsiders” and “insiders,” Denis Cosgrove describes how:

[1] The visible forms [of the land] and their harmonious integration to the eye, may indeed be a constituent part of people’s relationship with the surroundings of their daily lives, but such considerations are subservient to other aspects of a working life with family and community. The composition of their landscape is much more integrated and inclusive with the diurnal course of life’s events—with birth, death, festival, tragedy—all the occurrences that lock together human time and place. For the insider there is no clear separation of self from scene, subject from object.

To the degree that everyday inhabitants experience landscape, they do so in a general state of distraction, and more through habit and use than through vision alone. Their eidetic image of place is bound into a greater phenomenal range of significance than vision or contemplation affords. By contrast, the outsider—the tourist, the spectator, the state, the administrative authority, the designer and planner—views landscape as an object, a thing to behold, and not only scenically but instrumentally and ideologically. Enterprises such as tourism, planning, and resource management are predicated precisely on such a synoptic management of land. Total vision affords a powerful set of instruments to not only describe the world but also to condition and control it. Just as there is no innocent eye, there is no neutral or passive imaging, meaning that landscape, too, as image, is neither inactive nor benign. If detachment and estrangement engender the very concept of landscape—as distanced prospect—then perhaps, too, landscape itself precipitates only further estrangement and withdrawal. This is landscape’s dark side, alluded to in this book’s introduction.

As Michel Foucault and others have argued over the past twenty-five years, visual regimes—such as perspective and aerial views—are extremely effective instruments of power, enabling mass surveillance, projection, and camouflage. Synoptic, radiating vision extends a gaze that makes the viewer the master of all prospects, a scopic regime of control, authority, distance, and cool instrumentality. Much of the so-called postmodern critique is targeted at exposing the authoritarian and alienating characteristics of synoptic objectification, including master planning (aerial regimes) and scenography (oblique and perspectival regimes). Extended to landscape, this critique suggests that a too-narrow
concern for landscape as object (whether as formal composition or as quantifiable resource) overlooks the ideological, estranging, and aestheticizing effects of detaching the subject from the complex realities of participating in the world. Here, I want to echo Heidegger’s “loss of nearness” as well as modern culture’s withdrawal into privacy, as foreseen by Nietzsche and Marx.

Now, these remarks paint a perhaps too skeptical perspective that may be difficult for many to share. The scenic overlook, for example, is an apparently benign situation that presents a delightful view and transports one back into collective memory. One can survey the land with detached and distanced safety, caught momentarily in the dreamy and idealized presence of a harmonious and pleasing past. Many find escape from the ills of contemporary society in the scene and in their experience of recollection. That the scene itself displaces viewers, keeps them at a safe and uninvolved distance, and thus presents the landscape as little more than an aesthetic object of attention, escapes the attention of the gazing subject, as does the fact that the scenic moment literally transports viewers back in time, effectively decontextualizing them from the very real ills of the present. Obviously, looking at landscapes is a seductive and seemingly innocent affair, one that provides delight and pleasure for many, especially given the incredible and still-rising popularity of tourism, National Park attendance, and weekend drives in the country. Clearly, the public does not find landscape’s scenic beauty at all a problem.

Indeed, scenic landscapes would not be a problem were it not for the sadly sentimental and escapist understructure that pervades their viewing; **there is simply nothing to look forward to.** Here, landscape is nothing more than an empty sign, a dead event, a deeply aestheticized experience that holds neither portent nor promise of a future. Both evil and invention are hidden, and the viewer is allowed to momentarily forget and escape from present and future difficulties, finding compensation in the recollection of earlier, “simpler” times. The net effect is personal withdrawal and nostalgia for the presence of the past, both of which are rooted in an aestheticized—rather than a productive, useful, or engaging—landscape experience.

Furthermore, the scenic landscape tends not only to displace the viewing subject in both space and time but also to displace the objects that it contains. As the geographer Jonathan Smith explains, the “durability” and autonomy of landscape causes its physical appearance to move further and further away from the agency and scene of its creation, and with this displacement “it loses the taint of intention and assumes the purity of nature.”[5] In other words, because of the passage of time, landscape decontextualizes its artifactuality and takes on the appearance of something natural. Such enduring innocence may well herald great emancipating potential (as the landscape itself escapes the authority and control of its makers), but it also harbors a deceit that can be covertly appropriated by those who exercise power in society. For Smith, this point raises the question “of how the visible landscape might structure our regard of elements in that landscape...[and particularly] how it might, when judiciously styled, structure our regard of groups with certain social pretensions, privileged groups with a particular stake in the mode in which they are regarded.”[6] Moreover, the seductive appeal of the “judiciously styled” visual landscape “may forestall reflection on the failure of society to furnish its members with the means to consume landscapes in more practical [and equitable] ways.”[7] In other words, landscape can often obscure from its occupants the ideological impulses that motivated its formation and instead foster in them the feeling that they are in possession of a beautiful and innocent past, that they have escaped from the inequities and problems of the present.

It is through styling (design), of course, that one imbues the landscape with allusions to regional and cultural identity, enabling its occupants to believe that they are actually part of a collective, refined, and enlightened society. This is often an illusion, however, because the only real participation is that of the “little consumer” in the various aesthetic cultures of consumption. Here, think not only of the obvious references in real estate–driven suburbia and regal, colonial, and aristocratic images but also of the popular rise in the gardening and horticultural industry, or the recent trend in naturalist gardening and landscaping that inspires a sense of participation in the ecological and green movements. Landscape is bound into the marketplace and is available only at a price—the price of a package tour, an entry fee, a real estate view, or even the price of a scenic representation in souvenirs, photographs, and advertising.[8]

The veil of pretense that landscape erects is not, however, impermeable. In fact, its dominant, idealizing, and objectifying effects are broken every day. The erring realities of life contaminate the purity of any dominant master plan; an infinite number of “happenings” lend irony and disjuncture to a given scene. Machines in gardens, extermination trucks in countrified suburbs, homeless people in the civic center, and garbage on the church steps are examples of an ironic turn. Such everyday ironies reveal the pretense of representation and open social convention to critique and reflection. As Jonathan Smith writes,
“When closely observed, every self-image humans have written into the landscape will betray its pretensions with ironic affirmations of an order that is both wider and weirder.” In other words, the landscape construct is inherently unstable, an indeterminate dimension that can be opened up through artistic practices and made to reveal alternative sets of possibility.

Consequently, to continue to construe the practice of landscape as the creation of seductive and beautiful settings is only to forestall confronting the problems of contemporary life. Veiling toxic sites or forest clear-cuts with buffer strips of hedgerow and wildflowers, while well intended, does not exactly address their causes and effects. Similarly, the largely scenic reconstruction of European-inspired streets and squares in today’s modern cities does not guarantee—and may actually retard—the performance of authentic public life (a point rendered even more ironic by the prevalence of surveillance cameras and security measures associated with many of these corporate-sponsored projects). As scenic or semantically encoded reserves, contemporary landscape expressions fail to activate anything more than the imagery of their own obsolescence, stylistic issues notwithstanding. The pictorial impulse denies deeper modes of existence, interrelationship, and creativity; it conceals the agendas of those who commission and construct it, and it seriously limits the design and planning arts in more critically shaping alternative cultural relationships with the earth. Whereas the architectural and planning arts work to improve the human condition, they are reduced under largely representational regimes to simply expressing or commenting on that condition. And, whereas the connaisseurs and the intelligentsia may enjoy the associative play of narrative references in high-art design, little that is socially emancipating and enabling results from authorial, representational landscapes.

The preceding paragraphs simplify the case greatly, but it is not my purpose here to outline a further critique of scenography. I am more interested in drawing a distinction between landskip (landscape as contrivance, primarily visual and sometimes also iconic or significant) and landschaft (landscape as an occupied milieu, the effects and significance of which accrue through tactility, use, and engagement over time). Both terms connote images, but the latter compromises a fuller, more synaesthetic, and less picturable range than the former. Furthermore, the working landscape, forged collectively and according to more utilitarian demands than anything artistic or formal, has been more the traditional domain of descriptive analysis by historians and geographers than of speculation by landscape architects."

And yet, given the obvious limits of landscape as representation, not to mention the pathetic failing of most of what passes as landscaping today, is it possible to realign the landscape architectural project toward the productive and participatory phenomena of the everyday, working landscape? By this I mean to suggest a return neither to agrarian existence nor to functionalist practices but rather to emphasize the experiential intimacies of engagement, participation, and use over time, and to place geometrical and formal concerns in the service of human economy. In this sense, the city is as much a participatory landscape as are the highly technological energy and agricultural fields of the Southwest, the worked plots of private gardens, and the activities circulating across vast urban surfaces. Similarly, we might say that gardens are defined less by formal appearances than through the activities of gardening, just as agricultural fields derive their form from the logistics of farming, and cities from the flows, processes, and forces of urbanization. In the working landschaft, performance and event assumes conceptual precedence over appearance and sign.

The emphasis here shifts from object appearances to processes of formation, dynamics of occupancy, and the poetics of becoming. While these processes may be imaged, they are not necessarily susceptible to picturing. As with reading a book or listening to music, the shaping of images occurs mentally. Thus, if the role of the landscape architect is less to picture or represent these activities than it is to facilitate, instigate, and diversify their effects in time, then the development of more performative forms of imaging (as devising, enabling, unfolding techniques) is fundamental to this task (Fig. 3).

A move away from ameliorative and scenographic designs toward more productive, engineering strategies necessitates a parallel shift from appearances and meanings to more prosaic concerns for how things work, what they do, how they interact.

Fig 3. Carte Figurative des pertes successives en hommes de l'Armée Français dans la campagne de Russie, 1812-1813. Charles Joseph Minard. 1861. Taken from E.J. Marey, La Méthode Graphique (Paris, 1885). This time-space map depicts the movement of Napoleon’s army across Russia, the width of the band diminishing as the size of the army is reduced. The lower black line shows continued losses upon the retreat back to Poland owing to a bitterly cold winter.
and what agency or effects they might exercise over time. A return to complex and instrumental landscape issues involves more organizational and strategic skills than those of formal composition per se, more programmatic and metric practices than solely representational. Under such an operational rubric, issues such as program, event space, utility, economy, logistics, production, constraints, and desires become foregrounded, each turned through design toward newly productive and significant ends. This turning, as in rhetorical turn or the more interventionist détour, is allied with the French term dispositif. This refers to the tactical but subtle and tempered disposition of parts (as in arrangement, complexion, management, and array). In setting up a well-disposed field, the designer stages the conditions necessary to precipitate a maximum range of opportunities in time, turning negatives and limits into positives and potentials.

Although I am moving perhaps too quickly through this complex and important subject, I want to bring the question of image back into play, particularly the efficacy of imaging, or its agency in turning, forming, and enabling. To restate an important point, no matter how objective and descriptive the claims for it might be, imaging always exercises agency, actively unfolding, generating, and actualizing emergent realities. While theorists and historians focus on the object or the idea, designers focus on the actual activities of creativity with the “doing” and with the often bewildering effects of bodying forth things neither foreseen nor predetermined. The question, then, concerns not so much the kinds of images designers should work with but rather what kinds of imaging activities should be developed and advanced. I am referring here to the actual durational experience of mapping, drawing, modeling, and making as a generative sequence in creative thinking (Fig. 4). This is where a clear distinction between imaging and picturing needs to be made.

W.J.T. Mitchell characterizes the distinctions between picture and image as:

...the difference between a constructed, concrete object (frame, support, materials, pigments, facture) and the virtual, phenomenal appearance that it provides for the beholder; the difference between a deliberate act of representation (“to picture or depict”) and a less voluntary, perhaps even passive or automatic act (“to image or imagine”); the difference between a specific kind of visual representation (the “pictorial” image) and the whole realm of iconicity (verbal, acoustic, mental images).

Mitchell describes this latter category as eidetic images, or:

...sensible forms...which (according to Aristotle) emanate from objects and imprint themselves on the wax-like receptacles of our senses like a signet ring; the fantasmata, which are revived versions of those impressions called up by the imagination in the absence of the objects that originally stimulated them;...those “appearances” which (in common parlance) intrude between ourselves and reality.

Thus, Mitchell identifies five families of image: the graphic (as in the picture), the optical (as in the mirror), the perceptual (as in cognitive sense), the mental (as in dreams, memories, and ideas), and the verbal (as in description and metaphor). Of course, each is never independent of the other categories; the mixing of synaesthetic senses and impressions is inevitable. Consequently, not all images are picturable, as in those mental ideas one “sees” but that bear no likeness to natural perception. One might speak here of an aesthetics of invisibility, a perception of essences. Speech, verbal description, gestures, and other rhetorical figures conjure up such otherwise invisible images, allowing one to see an idea. The ancient Greeks recognized the image aspect of ideas, as in the term eidos, which conjoins “idea” with “something seen.” This is why imaging, understood as idea formation, is integral to the conception and practice of landscape. In landschaft, the making of a picture participates in and makes what is to be pictured, whereas in landschaft the formation of synaesthetic, cognitive images forges a collective sense of place and relationship evolved through work.

This latter phenomenon can be likened to a kind of mental map, or diagram, a spatio-organizational image that is not necessarily picturable but is nonetheless laconic and communicable. As with all maps, such an image produces an appearance that is otherwise not visible, even though it rings true and eventually naturalizes into accepted convention. After all, space by itself is neither sensible nor imaginable, but is instead created in the act of imaging. Such eidetic constructs effectively bind individuals to a collective and orient them
within a larger milieu. Thus, as highly situated and subjectively constituted schemata, eidetic mappings lie at the core of shaping an invisible landscape, one that is more an unfolding spatiality than surface appearance, more poetic property than the delineation of immediate real estate (Figs. 5 and 6).

Now, what does all this mean for landscape architectural practice? First, it points to both the difficulties and potentials that underlie representational technique in design, especially those conventions—such as plan, perspective, and rendering—that have become so institutionalized and taken for granted that we fail to appreciate their force and efficacy in shaping things. Second, it points to the limits exercised by the pictorial impulse over other aspects of knowing and belonging, highlighting the difficulty of representing other dimensions of being. And third, it suggests a need to revise, enhance, and invent forms of representational technique that might engender more engaging landscapes than the still-life vignettes of many contemporary landscapes. Those techniques that might prove most useful in this regard may be called _eidetic operations_—specific ideational techniques for construing (imagining) and constructing (projecting) new landscapes. These are partly

Thus, explains Frascari, "technographies are enigmas that can only be solved in construction...images that are played in the world of construction but not necessarily explained."^{22}

Designers need to more fully equip their arsenal of eidetic operations, in both the imaginative and efficacious senses of technographies. In reading analyses of image construction—whether E.H. Gombrich, Nelson Goodman, Rudolf Arnheim, Jean Piaget, Ernst Cassirer, Norman Bryson, or W.J.T. Mitchell, for instance—or in simply looking at the great works of art over the centuries—whether maps, paintings, collage, performance arts, or cinematic and digital media—I am struck by the range of types and forms of representation in comparison to the relatively small number of techniques used in the landscape, architectural, and planning arts. Imaging has a metaphoric agency in that the (mostly arbitrary) bringing together of two or more elements fosters a host of associative possibilities. When Picasso joins a bicycle handlebar to a down-turned seat, the new union is suggestive not only of a bull’s head but also of a minotaur (as in part animal, part machine), an image that may be actualized by placing and using the assembly on a real bicycle. Similarly, such extension of association is achieved through the ideogram, or the pairing of two elements to produce a new image, a conception that is otherwise not picturable. This is exemplified, for instance, in Duchamp’s _Genre Allegory_ (George Washington), 1943, where iodine-stained gauze bandage, speckled with military stars, constitutes the profile silhouette of Washington and invokes a tattered American flag, if not the rupture of the American sense of nationhood (Fig. 7).

Such eidetic images are fundamental stimuli to creativity and invention; they do not represent the reality of an idea but rather inaugurate its possibility. By contrast, images in conventional design practice tend more toward the wholly technological, the strictly denotative, the explicit, and the immediately intelligible. I am more than well aware of the increasing preponderance of unintelligible,
hermetic abstractions on the academic gallery and magazine circuits; however, a range of imaginative and demonstrative eidetic instruments greater than that the conventional practitioner currently employs must be developed if landscape and urbanism are to be recovered as significant contemporary practices. If landscape architects construct ideas, then the role of imaging in idea formation and projection needs to be better articulated than simply by opposing "artistic" renderings to "technical" working documents. In other words, perhaps a key to understanding eidetic imaging in design is found in a kind of thinking that is neither instrumental nor representational but simultaneously both.

It should be emphasized that such innovations do not necessarily have to be radical and completely new; they may derive equally from a subtle realignment of the codes and conventions of some convention or technique. In an essay on architectural drawing, David Leatherbarrow has argued that the primary mode of eidetic imaging in building belongs to the orthographic views of plan and section: "The plan view presents a simultaneity that mosaic seeing never enjoys; the section offers a penetration that is strikingly detective. Each translates depth by concentrating the temporality of its eventual unfolding." The fact that orthography enables architectural insight and ideation in such fundamental and yet inexhaustible ways makes it perhaps the most powerful tool of eidetic imaging for spatial design. In recent years, the superimposition of multiple and sometimes incongruent layers in plan and section has led to the generation of new possibilities. Rem Koolhaas, for instance, effectively altered traditional large-scale planning and diagramming from simply composing form and organizing program to completely reformulating form and program into freshly hybrid conditions. The dismantling and isolation of layers and elements in plan not only proposes a productive working method, akin to montage, but also focuses attention on the logic of making the landscape rather than on its appearance per se. Bernard Tschumi's work with notation and combinatorial indexes further exemplifies the reworking of certain orthographic and choreographic conventions.


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In a similar vein, contemporary urban designers (such as Koolhaas, MVRDV, and a-topos) have developed a series of techniques they call "datascapes." These are revisions of conventional analytical and quantitative maps and charts that both reveal and construct the shape-forms of forces and processes operating across a given site (Fig. 8). Not only are these imagings constructive and suggestive of new spatial formations but also they are so "objectively" constructed—derived from numbers, quantities, facts, and pure data—that they have great persuasive force in the hugely bureaucratic decision-making and management aspects of contemporary city design. Where they differ from the quantitative maps of conventional planning is in their imaging of data in knowingly rhetorical and generatively instrumental ways. They are designed not only to reveal the spatial effects of shaping forces (such as regulatory, zoning, legal, economic, and logistical rules and conditions) but also to construct an eidetic argument in space-time geometry. The artistry lies in the use of the technique, how things are framed and set up. There is no assumption of truth or positivist methodology; instead, the datascape planner reveals new possibilities latent in a given field simply by framing the issues differently. Unlike the assumed and passive neutrality of traditional data maps, datascapes reformulate given conditions in such a way as to produce novel and inventive solutions.

The revision of such fundamental imaging techniques as mapping, planning, diagramming, and sectioning effectively liberates the designer/planner from representation. In concentrating on how things work, how they go together, and how the project makes sense accords priority to the working of inhabited ground as opposed to the formalization of scenic landscapes. Rather than a series of drawings that show what a finished project looks like or how all the different parts fit together, I am arguing for the thinking through a program—not a description—that outlines the performative dimensions of a

Fig 8. Housing Silo, Amsterdam: number of dwellings to area occupied. MVRDV, 1996.
Hybridized and composite diagram techniques will allow even further advances in landscape formation because of their inclusive and instrumental capacity. Techniques such as layering and separation, for example, enable a multiplicity of issues to be included and incorporated into the development of a project. Composite montage is essentially an affiliative and productive technique, aimed not toward limitation and control but toward emancipation, heterogeneity, and open-ended relations among parts. In particular, analytic and systematic operations can precipitate revelatory and rich effects. This point is as true for the dense sketches and notations inscribed and overlaid in the technical drawings of Carlo Scarpa, for instance, where multiple views and scales are developed as a sort of speculative yet systematic unfolding, as it is for the more strategic layer-diagrams by architects such as Koolhaas, Tschumi, and Eisenman. Whereas both these imaging types differ significantly in their formation and function, they share the same character of incorporating multiple levels of information; they avoid immediacy and reduction. Moreover, composite techniques focus on the instrumental function of drawing with regard to production; they are efficacious rather than representational. In other words, through utilizing a variety of analytic and analogous imaging techniques, otherwise disparate parts can be brought into productive relationship, less as parts of a visual composition and more as means or agents.

Other composite imaging operations include ideograms, imagetexts, scorings, pictographs, indexes, samples, game boards, cognitive tracings, and scalings. Imagetexts, in particular, are conspicuously absent and underdeveloped in the design arts. These are synthetic and dialectical composites of words and pictures that together contain and produce an array of striking and otherwise unpicturable images. As Mark Taylor describes, “The audio-visual trace of the word involves an inescapable materiality that can be thought only if it is figured.” Whereas most architectural and planning images combine words on drawings (as labels, keys, names, etc.), the sheer connotative power of this combination is rarely developed beyond what is, again, a merely descriptive function. And yet imagetexts by artists as divergent as William Blake, Richard Long, and Barbara Kruger, and by architects as divergent as Daniel Libeskind, Raoul Bunschoten, and Arakawa and Madeline Gins push the rhetorical and transfigurative force of synaesthetic imaging in extremely suggestive ways. To echo Mitchell, imagetexts, like ideograms, “must be construed not just as representations but as whole conceptions.”

The landscape imagination is a power of consciousness that transcends visualization. To continue to project landscapes as formal and pictorial objects is to reduce significantly the full scope of the landscape idea. If ideas are images projected into the political and cultural imagination in ways that guide societies as they try to manage change, then their absence can only precipitate social regression into memory (nostalgia), on the one hand, or complete deference to technology (rational expediency), on the other. How one generates and effectuates ideas is bound into a cunning fluency with imaging. Similarly, the future of landscape as a culturally significant practice is dependent on the capacity of its inventors to image the world in new ways and to body forth those images in richly phenomenal and efficacious terms.

Fig. 9. Site construction sequence, Venice Island, Pennsylvania. Wookju Jeong, 1998.

Fig. 10. Ideogram, Greenport Harbordfront, New York. James Corner, 1996.

Fig. 11. Álsýð Gameboard, James Corner, 1999.
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23 Ibid., 16–17.
28 This is a slightly narrowed definition. Mitchell, Picture Theory, extends the term to cinema, advertising, cartoons, and theater (for instance: „Artaud’s emphasis on mute spectacle and Brecht’s deployment of textual projections are not merely ‘aesthetic’ innovations but precisely motivated interventions in the semio-politics of the stage,” p. 91). Also see Roland Barthes, The Responsibility of Forms: Music, Art and Representation (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1985).
30 Mitchell, Picture Theory, 146.